2024 International Conference on Language Research and Communication (ICLRC 2024) held September 20-22, 2024 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It is a tremendous honor for the CambridgeInnovation Center (Singapore) to serve as the collaborative institution to enhance collaboration and mutually develop for being an international platform. ICLRC 2024 focuses on high quality presentations and papers that address contemporary issues on fundamental research leading to new methods, or adaptation of existing methods for new applications related to the topics of language studies and (...) cultural communication. It aims to deliveran outstanding global forum for academics, researchers, scientists, engineers, students in the worldto link up, exchange information and discussion. The conference has 6 keynote speeches and 9 invited speeches in total, and it has drawn about 120 delegates from 9 countries (China, India, Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, Philippines). The conference comprised a diverse spectrum of highly technical presentations by keynote and invited speaker sessions and authors of submitted papers. We are pleased to present the SHS Web of Conferences of the ICLRC 2024 and we sincerely hope that all participants and interested readers would be benefited from this proceedings. We want toexpress our heartfelt appreciation to our contributors, sponsors, colleagues and associations thahelped make this conference successful. We’d also want to thank everyone on the committees and editorial board for the assistance and feedback. We expect this conference would encourage future language studies and cultural communication research, We look forward to seeing all of you at the next ICLRC. (shrink)

Let A be an infinite Δ₂⁰ set and let K be creative: we show that K≤Q A if and only if K≤Q₁ A. (Here ≤Q denotes Q-reducibility, and ≤Q₁ is the subreducibility of ≤Q obtained by requesting that Q-reducibility be provided by a computable function f such that Wf(x)∩ Wf(y)=∅, if x \not= y.) Using this result we prove that A is hyperhyperimmune if and only if no Δ⁰₂ subset B of A is s-complete, i.e., there is no Δ⁰₂ subset (...) B of A such that \overline{K}≤s B, where ≤s denotes s-reducibility, and \overline{K} denotes the complement of K. (shrink)

We prove that the degree structures of the d.c.e. and the 3-c.e. Turing degrees are not elementarily equivalent, thus refuting a conjecture of Downey. More specifically, we show that the following statement fails in the former but holds in the latter structure: There are degrees f > e > d > 0 such that any degree u ≤ f is either comparable with both e and d, or incomparable with both.

The ritual handling of serpents remains an unnoticed cultural form for the explanatory aims and theoretical insights desired by cognitive scientists of religion. In the current article, we introduce the Hood and Williams archives at The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga that contains data culled from Hood’s 40-plus year career of studying serpent handlers. The archives contain hundreds of hours of interviews and recordings of speaking in tongues, handling fire, drinking poison, and taking up serpents by different congregants and congregations. (...) The archive remains a rich but untapped source of data for building, testing, and refining cognitive theories of ritual in general, and serpent handling in specific. We connect Hood’s work to current cognitive theories and engage critically with research on the social functions of ritual. Finally, we discuss several further reasons to pay more attention to SHS communities and practices in cognitive theories of ritual. (shrink)

al-Mujallad al-awwal. Muqaddimāt al-taḥqīq wa-muqaddimat al-Imām al-Zubaydī lil-Itḥāf -- al-mujallad al-thānī. Kitāb al-ʻIlm ilá nihāyat al-bāb al-thālith -- al-mujallad al-thālith. Tatimmat kitāb al-ʻilm min al-bāb al-rābiʻ ilá ākhir al-kitāb -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ. Kitāb Qawāʻid al-ʻaqāʼid -- al-mujallad al-khāmis. Kitāb Asrār al-ṭahārah -- al-mujallad al-sādis. Kitāb Asrār al-ṣalāh ilá nihāyat shurūṭ al-jumʻah min al-bāb al-khāmis -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ. Tatimmat kitāb asrār al-ṣalāh min ādāb al-jumʻah ilá ākhir al-kitāb -- al-mujallad al-thāmin. Kitābā Asrār al-zakāh wa-asrār al-ṣawm -- al-mujallad al- tāsiʻ. Kitāb asrār (...) al-ḥajj -- al-mujallad al-ʻāshir. Kitābā ādāb tilāwat al-Qurʼān wa-al-adhkār wa-al-daʻawāt -- al-mujallad al-ḥādī ʻashar. Kitābā tartīb al-awrād wa-tafḍīl iḥyāʼ al-layl wa-ādāb al-akl -- al-mujalladal-thānī ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-Nikāḥ wa-ādāb al-Kasb wa-al-maʻāsh -- al-mujallad al-thālith ʻashar. Kitāb al-Ḥalāl wa-al-ḥarām -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ ʻashar. Kitāb al-Ulfah wa-al-ukhuwwah -- al-mujallad al-khāmis ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-ʻUzlah wa-ādāb al-Safar -- al-mujallad al-sādis ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-Samāʻ wa-al-wajd wa-al-Amr bi-al-maʻrūf wa-al-nahy ʻan al-munkar -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-maʻīshah wa-akhlāq al-nubūwah wa-sharḥ ʻajāʼib al-qalb -- al-mujallad al-thāmin ʻashar. Kitābā riyāḍat al-nafs wa-tahdhīb al-akhlāq wa-kasr al-shahwatayn -- al-mujallad al-tāsiʻ ʻashar. Kitābā āfāt al-lisān wa-dhamm al-ghaḍab -- al-mujallad al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-dunyā wa-dhamm al-bukhl -- al-mujallad al-ḥādī wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-jāh wa-dhamm al-kibr wa-al-ʻajab -- al-mujallad al-thānī wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-ghurūr wa-al-tawbah -- al-mujallad al-thālith wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā al-ṣabr wa-al-shukr -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā al-rajā wa-al-khawf -- al-mujallad al-khāmis wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-zuhd wa-al-faqr -- al-mujallad al-sādis wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa al-tawakkul -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-maḥabbah wa-al-shawq wa-al-uns wa-al-riḍā -- al-mujallad al-thāmin wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kutub al-ikhlāṣ wa-al-nīyah wa-al-murāqabah wa-al-muḥāsabah wa-al-tafakkur -- al-mujallad al- tāsiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb dhikr al-mawt wa-mā baʻdih ilá nihāyat al-bāb al-thāmin -- al-mujallad al-thalāthūn. Kitāb dhikr al-mawt wa-mā baʻdih ilá ākhar al-kitāb wa-yalīhi maṣādir al-taḥqīq. (shrink)

Yemeni writer Ahmed Qāsim al-Arīqī, in addition to his profession as a pharmacist, is a writer who has made a name for himself in the country's literary field, especially in the last fifteen years. A prolific writer, al-Arīqī is the author of poetry collections as well as stories and novels that emphasise awareness of the traditional issues of the Yemeni people. He has published "Maḳāmāt al-'Arīḳī" (2006), "Ġalṭṭetu Ḳalem" (2012), "Qurāt al-S̱-S̱elj" (2017), "Ta'riyya" (2018), "Zurbet al-Yumnā" (2018), "Da'wat al-Ḥuḳūl" (2019), (...) "Zuhr al-Ġarām" and "Sīret al-Kūbī" (2022). His novel "Yawma Māta al-Shaytan" (The Day Satan Died) was published electronically by Hindāwī Publishing House in 2022. The novel, which is approximately 120 pages, is written in six chapters. There are eleven passages in the first and fourth chapters, thirteen in the second and sixth chapters, twelve in the third chapter, and eight in the fifth chapter. The novel is about the adventures of a member of the army named Marwan Naji, who was wounded in the war between the Houthi militia and the Yemeni army, and after nine months in a coma, opens his eyes in a perfect world dominated by biological and technological advances. Symbolising the treatment of selfishness and various narcissisms with advanced vaccines through the death of Satan, the author describes Marwan's adventures in his world, which he sometimes describes as the realm of the jinn, in a very simple language, while not failing to criticise reality in its various political, social and religious dimensions. In fact, Marwan's world of imagination and fantasy is the main story of the novel, but not the only one. The author also includes the stories of family members in Marwan's world of turmoil, destruction, massacre, war and victory, giving the reader the opportunity to compare both worlds. While his mother Gusoun, his wife Hamide and his daughter Fatma, who later got engaged in time after being widowed, are the female characters of his real world, Professor Mari and Mariana, one of his seven wives, are the other important characters of his imaginary world. Gusûn is a devoted mother who does not leave the bedside of her comatose son, prays for him day and night and tries to do everything she can for his recovery. Gusûn, who is listened to at home to a certain extent, scolds her grandchildren to prevent the breakup of her son's home because of inheritance, defends that the existing wealth still belongs to her son and reminds them that she will not hesitate to spend money for his recovery. Gusûn's daughter-in-law Hamide also takes care of her husband, who shows no signs of recovery. Hamide, who is not as patient as her mother-in-law, is also a jealous woman. On the other hand, although both of them display false religious tendencies that have no relation with real life, Gusûn is more prone to the superstitious approaches put forward and adopted in the name of religion. Fatma is also a widow who, although she has the will to take care of her children and live her life alone, has been engaged for a long time to her uncle's son Münir, who, like her, took part in anti-regime demonstrations and whose love she believes in. Fatma, who is more conscious than her grandmother and mother, is not alien to the issues that society complains about and often participates in women's movements organised against the government. Professor Mari, one of the two important characters belonging to Marwan's imaginary world, is a psychologist and the chief physician of a large hospital who treats jealousy, anger, lying and selfishness, which are considered dangerous viruses, with vaccines developed by scientists. Professor Mari, who is personally involved in Marwan's treatment, also chairs the committee that records his memory and projects all his memories on a giant screen. Mariana, on the other hand, monitors Marwan's behaviour and thoughts through a biological chip to control the effect of the vaccines given to him, criticises him through the tragic images projected on the screen and provides information that will facilitate his adaptation to his new world. In the article, in which the author's main published works are briefly introduced along with a broad summary of the novel, the social messages that an author, who is not indifferent to the realities of the geography he lives in, tries to give directly and indirectly with a language far from locality, are tried to be determined through the mentioned female characters. It is seen that the desire to become a single nation by making; love, brotherhood, friendship and peace dominant lies behind the author's novelisation of the dream of an ideal world symbolised by the death of Satan. (shrink)

Russkiĭ kosmizm v poiskakh absoli︠u︡ta : paralleli i peresechenii︠a︡ v muzykalʹnom, poėticheskom i izobrazitelʹnom tborchestve 1910-1920-kh godov -- Liki Moderna -- Putʹ k modernu : Georgiĭ Lʹvovich Katuar -- Stilʹ modern v tvorchestve Frederika Diliusa : kont︠s︡ert dli︠a︡ fortepiano s orkestrom do minor -- Stilʹ modern i tvorchestvo Bely Bartoka (na primere opery "Zamok gert︠s︡oga Sini︠a︡i︠a︡ Boroda") -- Frit︠s︡ Kreĭsler i stilʹ modern -- Klod Debi︠u︡ssi i Moris Ravelʹ : muzyka dli︠a︡ arfy -- Klod Debi︠u︡ssi : dvenadt︠s︡atʹ ėti︠u︡dov dli︠a︡ fortepiano (...) : ot ėkzersisa do installi︠a︡t︠s︡ii -- O dikhotomii "muzhskogo" i "zhenskogo" v Pi︠a︡toĭ sonate A.N. Skri︠a︡bina (na primere motivnoĭ metriki) -- Pod znakom moderna : A.N. Skri︠a︡bin i S.S. Prokofʹev v 1913 godu -- Avangard i modern v retrospektive -- O proi︠a︡vlenii︠a︡kh "modernizma" v ispolnitelʹskom iskusstve : F. Buzoni, M. I︠U︡dina, G. Gulʹd -- Sudʹba providt︠s︡a : fortepiannai︠a︡ muzyka Ėrika Sati v sovremennom akademicheskom muzykalʹnom mire -- Otgoloski ėpokhi modern : o nekotorykh smyslovykh osobennosti︠a︡kh sovremennykh fortepiannykh sochineniĭ (Ė. Denisov, S. Slonimskiĭ, G. Zaĭt︠s︡ev) -- Zapadnye pianisty - ispolniteli russkogo avangarda pervoĭ volny : Sh. Shleĭermakher, Kh. Khenk, M.-A. Amlen -- Muzyka k filʹmu "Kabinet doktora Kaligari" : mezhdu tvorcheskoĭ rekonstrukt︠s︡ieĭ i istoricheskoĭ imitat︠s︡ieĭ -- Podvodi︠a︡ itogi -- "Pozdniĭ modernizm" v muzyke kont︠s︡a XX - nachala XXI veka : nekotorye nabli︠u︡denii︠a︡ -- Po sledam konferent︠s︡ii "Ot moderna k futurizmu" (virtualʹnai︠a︡ beseda za kruglym stolom). (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up to (...) the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...) proposition’ and ‘sceptical hypothesis’ respectively. (SKC), however, fails for familiar reasons: since knowledge entails belief (KB), we can derive the falsity (F) from (SKC) by hypothetical syllogism, and thus reduce (SKC) to absurdity: (KB) Kxt[p] → Bxt[p]. (F) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Bxt[q]. (shrink)

We prove independence results concerning the number of nonisomorphic models (using the S-chain condition and S-properness) and the consistency of "ZCF + 2 ℵ 0 = ℵ 2 + there is a universal linear order of power ℵ 1 ". Most of these results were announced in [Sh 4], [Sh 5]. In subsequent papers we shall prove an analog f MA for forcing which does not destroy stationary subsets of ω 1 , investigate D-properness for various filters and prove the (...) consistency with G.C.H. of an axiom implying SH (for ℵ 1 ), and connected results. (shrink)

The article explores the private nature of subjectivity in programs of integration the phenomenology with naturalism. It is considered if their tools are relevant for the phenomenological, rather than naturalistic way of subjectivity’s explaining. Justification of the key ideas is provided with the help of such concepts as “body image”, “body scheme”, (Sh. Gallagher), “ontological significance” (L. Baker), “experience”, “cognitive niches” (F. Varela), “transparent body” (T. Fuchs). Based on the traditional phenomenology of E. Husserl, it is shown that a set (...) of approaches that integrate phenomenology and naturalism within the framework of “first-person philosophy” can be characterized as a phenomenology without a phenomenological subject. It is shown that the phenomenological nature of the self-perspective in integrative programs is more likely to be understood as the qualification and privacy of subjectivity, while the transcendental aspect of the unobservable and biased consciousness is practically not taken into account. The article concludes that the logic of some projects of integration of phenomenology and naturalism overlook this transcendental peculiarity of consciousness, its fundamentally unobserved character. The classical phenomenological approach emphasizes on the extra-natural, biased, and non-empirical nature of consciousness. The role and significance of the phenomenological approach is not limited to the idea of “what-is-likeness” and privacy of subjective states. Phenomenology, which preserves the idea of the subject, means a radical break with the ontology of things and, in general, with the ontology of something objective at all. (shrink)

The property on the filter in Definition 1, a kind of large cardinal property, suffices for the proof in Liu Shelah [LiSh484] and is proved consistent as required there (see Conclusion 6). A natural property which looks better, not only is not obtained here, but is shown to be false (in Claim 7). On earlier related theorems see Gitik Shelah [GiSh310]. On such games see e.g. [Je], [Sh-b], [Sh-f].

Brain-centered theories of consciousness seem to face insuperable difficulties. While some philosophers now doubt that the hard problem of consciousness will ever be solved, others call for radically new approaches to conscious experience. In this article I resurrect a largely forgotten approach to consciousness known as neorealism. According to neorealism, consciousness is merely a part, or cross-section, of the environment. Neorealism implies that all conscious experiences, veridical or otherwise, exist outside of the brain and are wholly independent of being perceived (...) or not; nonveridical perceptions of the environment over an arbitrarily short period of time are supposed to be objective constituents of the environment over a more extended time scale. I argue here that neorealism fares at least as well as brain-centered theories of consciousness on a number of fundamental issues. On one fundamental issue—the nature of the relation between veridical and nonveridical perceptions—neorealism outperforms its competitors. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF HUMAN PERSONS JOHN F. CROSBY, III Franciscan University of Steubenville Steubenville, Ohio I PROPOSE TO explore the idea that persons do not exist as replaceable specimens of or as mere instances of an ideal or type, but rather exist in some sense for their own sakes, each existing as incommunicably his or her own.1 I undertake this study in the conviction that the incommunicability of persons (...) is profoundly characteristic for them precisely as persons, and has a major role to play in any philosophy of the person. And there is an entirely different reason which attracts me to this subject. I think that most of what I have to say here can find acceptance across a broad spectrum of philosophical positions. At a time when thinkers are increasingly suspicious of universally valid truth about man, when many of them think that a vision of man is proper only to some tradition and valid only within that tradition and not beyond it, one can offer a salutary challenge to one's contemporaries by showing a centrally important truth about persons which, as I say, can be accepted by philosophers coming from the most various points of view. Suppose that you were to minimalize the death of someone by saying that at least the human species did not die with him or her, as if the immortality of the species more than compensated for the mortality of this individual : everyone understands that you would thereby radically depersonalize the deceased. Or suppose that you were grieving over the death of someone dear to you, and a friend tried to comfort you with the thought that the 1 My thanks to Josef Seifert, William Frank, Damian Fedoryka, and Katryna Fedoryka for their comments on earlier drafts of this study. The text of this article forms Chapter Two of my book, Essay on Personal Selfhood, which is close to completion. 403 404 JOHN F. CROSBY, III particular excellences of the deceased, which awakened your love, also exist in other human beings who are still living, as if you could continue to love in them what you had loved in the deceased. Again, everyone understands that if you treat people having excellences as if they were replaceable specimens of those excellences, then you lose your grip on them as persons. But why is this? Why is personhood driven out of human beings as soon as their species-membership, or their particular excellences, are thought to predominate in them? What is that incommunicability of each person which is obscured as soon as persons are thought to be only specimens? One commonly thinks that this aspect of personal selfhood has been recognized only in modern thought; in fact it was recognized already by St. Thomas Aquinas. Creatura autem rationalis divinae providentiae substat sicut secundum se gubernata et provisa, non solum propter speciem, ut aliae corruptibiles creaturae : quia individuum quod gubernatur solum propter speciem, non gubernatur propter seipsum; creatura autem rationalis propter seipsam gubernatur, ut ex dictis manifestum est. Sic igitur solae rationales creaturae directionem a Deo ad suos actus accipiunt non solum propter speciem, sed secundum individuum.2 Notice that Aquinas teaches here the metaphysical ultimacy of personal incommunicability; it exists even before God in the sense 2 " Now, a rational creature exists under divine providence as a being governed and provided for in himself, and not simply for the sake of his species, as is the case with other corruptible creatures. For the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species is not governed for its own sake, but the rational creature is governed for his own sake, as is clear from what we have said (ch. 112). And so, only rational creatures receive direction from God in their acts, not only for the species, but for the individual." Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 113 (Bourke translation). By the way, Chapters 111-114 of Book III seem to me to constitute the most " personalist " passage' in the entire corpus of St. Thomas. The modern reader sees to his amazement that St. Thomas here has already made his own the Kantian idea that each person in a sense exists for his... (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Learning How to Innovate as a Socio-epistemological Process of Co-creation: Towards a Constructivist Teaching Strategy for Innovation” by Markus F. Peschl, Gloria Bottaro, Martina Hartner-Tiefenthaler & Katharina Rötzer. Upshot: I introduce and discuss an advancement of the idea of “learning from the future,” called “interacting with the envisioned future.” Further, this approach is put into the context of the target article and the perspective of radical constructivism.

In this paper the author argues that love de re — love for a particular person — is an emotion that is singular in that the beloved person is an external constituent of that emotion. After comparing love de re with other de re attitudes, and distinguishing it from love de dicto, he rejects reductions of love de re to love de dicto. It will be demonstrated the lover must have a dynamic conception of the person he loves which is (...) derived from historical connections with him or her. A merely causal link is not enough. The way the beloved person appears to the lover cannot be reduced to an antecedently available picture or assembly of properties the lover appreciates, as cognitivists tend to claim. The theoretical background of the paper draws on insights of G. Evans and J. McDowell. (shrink)

References to energy of the universe have focussed upon the matter contribution, whereas the conservation laws must include a gravitational contribution as well. The conservation laws as applied to FRW cosmologies suggest a zero total energy irrespective of the spatial curvature when the value of the cosmological constant is taken to be zero. This result provides a useful constraint on models of the early universe and lends support to currently studied theories of the universe arising as a quantum fluctuation of (...) the vacuum. (shrink)

This article ana l yses the birth of some n e w female identities in Latin America, mar k e d b y strong cultural inn o v ation. The process of change has been w on b y political st r uggles that h a v e pe r mitted Latin American w omen to g ain some essential rights. More o v er the t e x t describes the compl e xity of syncretising all Lati n America, (...) but the common elements are more important than the di f ferences. H o w e v e r , accepting this d i v ersit y , the great inequality of basic essentials in the relationships be t w een w omen, is producing one v oice, one discourse and one common demand. F inal l y , it sh o ws the political contradictions in w hich contempora ry Latin America w omen l i v e, summoned to pa r ticipate, as mode r n w omen, in the institutions w hen these same institutions put them in positions of social, political and economic subordination. Despite these di f f iculties, it emphasises the political e xperiments that w omen are ca r r ying out to f ind a syncretism without eliminating cultural d i versit y. (shrink)

As a statistician, whose job is to advise on how to make inductions from observations with the aid of the theory of probability, I hope I shall be pardoned some comments on Mr. Kneale's discussion of this subject.